Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/216525 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 8129
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
Preferences about the vertical distribution of power in federal systems are not well understood. I argue that negative historical experiences with higher-level governments can plausibly raise demands for exit strategies and a devolution of power. But integration, for instance delegating power from the nation-state to a supra-national level or international organization, can also serve the purpose of overcoming history by constraining nation-state actions. I specify conditions for affecting current preferences, and apply this framework to the European Union. Empirically, the quasi-random division of the French regions Alsace and Lorraine allows estimating differences in support for integration in a spatial regression discontinuity design. More negative exposure to nation-state actions causes persistently higher support for European integration in three referenda and less euroscepticism in European elections. Survey evidence supports exit and integration as two complementary alternatives, revealing preferences to move power away from the nation-state, either to the regional or European level.
Subjects: 
nation-states
federalism
supra-national integration
international organizations
secession
minority regions
persistence
European Union support
Euroscepticism
European identity
JEL: 
D70
F50
H70
N24
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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