Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/217167 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Quantitative Economics [ISSN:] 1759-7331 [Volume:] 10 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New Haven, CT [Year:] 2019 [Pages:] 1233-1277
Verlag: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Zusammenfassung: 
We use rich microeconomic data on performance and choices of students at college entry to analyze interactions between the selection mechanism, eliciting college preferences through exams, and the allocation mechanism. We set up a framework in which success probabilities and student preferences are shown to be identified from data on their choices and their exam grades under exclusion restrictions and support conditions. The counterfactuals we consider balance the severity of congestion and the quality of the match between schools and students. Moving to deferred acceptance or inverting the timing of choices and exams are shown to increase welfare. Redistribution among students and among schools is also sizeable in all counterfactual experiments.
Schlagwörter: 
Education
two-sided matching
school allocation mechanism
policy evaluation
JEL: 
C57
D47
I21
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
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