Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/217171 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Citation: 
[Journal:] Quantitative Economics [ISSN:] 1759-7331 [Volume:] 10 [Issue:] 4 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New Haven, CT [Year:] 2019 [Pages:] 1401-1451
Publisher: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Abstract: 
This paper develops and estimates a life-cycle equilibrium labor search model in which heterogeneous firms determine health insurance provisions and heterogeneous workers sort themselves into jobs with different compensation packages over the life cycle. I study the optimal joint design of major policies in the Affordable Care Act (ACA) and the implications of targeting these policies to certain individuals. Compared with the health insurance system under the ACA, the optimal structure lowers the tax benefit of employer-sponsored health insurance and makes individual insurance more attractive to younger workers. Through changes in firms' insurance provisions, a greater number of younger workers sort into individual markets, which contributes to improving the risk pool in individual insurance and lowering the uninsured risk.
Subjects: 
Life-cycle equilibrium labor search
social insurance
joint design of policies
JEL: 
H51
I13
J32
J60
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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