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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 11 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2020 [Pages:] 1-21
Verlag: 
MDPI, Basel
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper experimentally investigates the impact of suggestive messages and tipping on a third party’s judgment. The experimental design uses a model with three players, wherein two players (A and B) create a joint project, and the third player (C) decides how to divide the project’s earnings between the first two players. In two treatments, player B has an opportunity to influence player C’s decision via a numeric message or an ex-post tip. The main finding of this paper is that giving player B the option to suggest a specific amount to the allocator does not increase his share. In contrast, when player C knows that player B can send him a tip, the share awarded to player B increases.
Schlagwörter: 
corruption
influence
reciprocity
tipping
lobbying
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Sonstige Angaben: 
APC was funded by the WZB and the Open Access fund of the Leibniz Association.
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