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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1983
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 548
Verlag: 
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Evanston, IL
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper is an introduction to the analysis of games with incomplete information, using a Bayesian model. the logical foundations of the Bayesian model are discussed. To describe rational behavior of players in a Bayesian game, two basic solution concerts are present: Bayesian equilibrium, for games in which the players cannot communicate; and Bayesian incentive-compatibility, for games in which the players can communicate. The concept of virtual utility is developed as a tool for characterizing efficient incentive-compatible coordination mechanisms.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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