Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/221299 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1991
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 940
Verlag: 
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Evanston, IL
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper considers a simple pairwise random matching game in the society populated by two groups of agents: Conformists and Nonconformists. Depending on the relative frequencies of intergroup and intragroup matchings, the best response dynamics show three types of asymptotic behaviors: global convergence, hysteresis and limit cycles. In the hysteresis case, Conformists set the social custom, and Nonconformists revolt against it; what action becomes the custom is determined by "history." In the limit cycle case, Nonconformists become fashion leaders and switch their actions periodically, while Conformists follow with delay.
Schlagwörter: 
Best response dynamics
Bifurcation
Equilibrium refinement
Evolutionary process
Hysteresis
Limit Cycles
Perfect foresight
dynamics
Strategic complements and substitutes
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
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