Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/221412 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1993
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 1055
Verlag: 
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Evanston, IL
Zusammenfassung: 
In this note we reconsider an argument, borrowed from causal decision theory, according to which rational and identical players should cooperate in a one-shot prisoner's dilemma. We argue that, regardless of how one views this type of reasoning, the example rpoints at a possible inconsistency in standard formulations of knowledge and decision. We suggest that when formalizing notions of "decision," "choice," and "rationality," care must be taken not to assume knowledge of one's own choice. Finally, the relationships to the classical problems of causal decision theory and of dterminism versus free will are briefly discussed.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
535.01 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.