Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/221730 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2004
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 1381
Verlag: 
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Evanston, IL
Zusammenfassung: 
We introduce a class of strategies which generalizes examples constructed in two-player games under imperfect private monitoring. A sequential equilibrium is belief-free if, after every private history, each player.s continuation strategy is optimal independently of his belief about his opponents. private histories. We provide a simple and sharp characterization of equililibrium payos using those strategies. While such strategies have desirable robustness properties, they are not rich enough to generate a folk theorem in most games besides the prisoner's dilemma, even when noise vanishes.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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