Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/222016 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IEHAS Discussion Papers No. MT-DP - 2018/3
Verlag: 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, Budapest
Zusammenfassung: 
I extend the standard global games framework by introducing an addition target on which agents can coordinate on. I compare this multidimensional case to the standard global games problem. Furthermore, I investigate the effects of consolidating the multiple targets. I find that introducing an additional option generates a negative strategic correlation between the options and thus weakens the coordination. However, unifying the options eliminates the endogenous correlation and thus restores the coordination. I also show two potential applications to be modeled by these kinds of games.
Schlagwörter: 
global games
coordination
JEL: 
C72
D84
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
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