Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/222099 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper No. 202
Publisher: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition, München und Berlin
Abstract: 
We experimentally analyze leading by example in a public goods game with two permanent and two temporary group members. Our results show that leadership when permanent and temporary members interact leads to lower contributions than interaction without leadership.
Subjects: 
Cooperation
leadership
social dilemma
public goods provision
experiment
JEL: 
C91
D03
D64
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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