Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/224202 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 358
Verlag: 
University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper provides a theory of strategic innovation project choice by incumbents and start-ups. We show that prohibiting killer acquisitions strictly reduces the variety of innovation projects. By contrast, we find that prohibiting other acquisitions only has a weakly negative innovation effect, and we provide conditions under which the effect is zero. Furthermore, for both killer and other acquisitions, we identify market conditions under which the innovation effect is small, so that prohibiting acquisitions to enhance competition would be justified.
Schlagwörter: 
innovation
killer acquisitions
merger policy
potential competition
start-ups
JEL: 
O31
L41
G34
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
707.71 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.