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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IFRO Working Paper No. 2020/11
Verlag: 
University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics (IFRO), Copenhagen
Zusammenfassung: 
We study decentralized task coordination. Tasks are of varying complexity and agents asymmetric: agents capable of completing high-level tasks may also take on tasks originally contracted by lower-level agents, facilitating system-wide cost reductions. We suggest a family of decentralized two-stage mechanisms in which agents first announce preferred individual workloads and then bargain over the induced joint cost savings. The second-stage negotiations depend on the first-stage announcements as specified through the mechanism's recognition function. We characterize mechanisms that incentivize cost-effective task allocation and further single out a particular mechanism, which additionally ensures a fair distribution of the system-wide cost savings.
Schlagwörter: 
Decentralized mechanisms
Implementation
Bargaining
Consistency
Blockchain
JEL: 
C72
C78
D47
D63
D78
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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Datei
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