Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/225980 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CFR Working Paper No. 20-08
Verlag: 
University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR), Cologne
Zusammenfassung: 
We provide evidence regarding mutual funds' motivation to hold lottery stocks. Funds with higher managerial ownership invest less in lottery stocks, suggesting that managers themselves do not prefer such stocks. The evidence instead supports that managers cater to fund investors' preference for such stocks. In particular, funds with more lottery holdings attract larger flows after portfolio disclosure compared to their peers, and poorly performing funds tend to engage in risk shifting by increasing their lottery holdings towards year-ends. Funds' aggregate holdings of lottery stocks contribute to their overpricing.
Schlagwörter: 
lottery stocks
risk shifting
fund performance
investor flows
stock mispricing
JEL: 
G11
G23
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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