Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/230279 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
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[Journal:] Journal of Public Economic Theory [ISSN:] 1467-9779 [Volume:] 23 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] Wiley [Place:] Hoboken, NJ [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 141-157
Verlag: 
Wiley, Hoboken, NJ
Zusammenfassung: 
This article questions whether excessive policing practices can persist in an environment where law enforcement policies are subject to political pressures. Specifically, it considers a setting where the police decide whether to conduct stops based on the suspiciousness of a person's behavior and the potential liability for conducting a wrongful stop. We establish that the liability level that results in a voting equilibrium is smaller than optimal, and consequently, that excessive policing practices emerge in equilibrium.
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