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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Cardiff Economics Working Papers No. E2017/16
Verlag: 
Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Cardiff
Zusammenfassung: 
We study repeated implementation in a model with overlapping generations of agents.It is assumed that the preferences of agents do not change during their lifetime.A social choice function selects an alternative in each period as a function of the preferences of agents who are alive in that period.We show that any social choice function satisfying mild necessary conditions is repeatedly implementable in subgame perfect equilibrium if there are at least three agents and they live sufficiently long.
Schlagwörter: 
Repeated Implementation
Subgame Perfect Implementation
Overlapping Generations
Necessary and Sufficient Conditions
JEL: 
C72
C73
D71
D82
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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