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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Cardiff Economics Working Papers No. E2018/25
Verlag: 
Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Cardiff
Zusammenfassung: 
This study presents a model in which interest groups compete for partially exclusive rents and the number of winners is stochastic. Partial exclusivity can explain the low empirical estimates of rent dissipation that create the Tullock paradox. However,partial exclusivity also increases aggregate effort and social waste. This study includes an empirical analysis of U.S. state-level lobbying expenditures, which reveals another puzzle regarding the constant relationship between aggregate expenditures and the number of spenders. In contrast to the existing rent-seeking contest models, this outcome is consistent with partially exclusive rents when the contest is designed by a rent-seeking maximising policymaker.
Schlagwörter: 
rent seeking
interest groups
multiple-winner contests
rent dissipation
contest design
lobbying expenditures
JEL: 
C72
D72
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
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