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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/23066
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DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Haucap, Justus | en |
dc.contributor.author | Kirstein, Roland | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-29T15:36:10Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-29T15:36:10Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2001 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23066 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper analyzes the incentive effects of pollution taxes versus pollution permits for a revenue maximizing Government that also pursues environmental objectives. In our model, pollution permits are analyzed as durable goods, and the leasing of pollution permits is seen as an equivalent to a pollution tax. We show that environmental policy based on durable pollution permits can be welfare superior to a pollution tax regime. The intuition is that a monopolistic Government would, in order to maximize its revenues, try to restrict the permit sales below the welfare maximizing level. While a pollution tax or leasing charge allows the Government to credibly commit to a monopoly level of pollution in future periods, a system based on durable permits weakens the monopolistic Government?s ability to credibly restrict future sales. Therefore, a pollution tax regime may be better for the environment and simultaneously increase Government revenues, but social welfare is larger with pollution permits. Hence, a regime where the Government cannot commit to monopoly quantities may be preferable from a welfare economic perspective. This argument in favor of durable permits complements more traditional arguments based on information asymmetries and innovation incentives. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aUniversität des Saarlandes, Center for the Study of Law and Economics (CSLE) |cSaarbrücken | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCSLE Discussion Paper |x2001-06 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H2 | en |
dc.subject.jel | K3 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D7 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Emissions Permits | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Pollution Tax | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Time Inconsistency | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Durable Goods | en |
dc.subject.stw | Ökosteuer | en |
dc.subject.stw | Emissionsrechte | en |
dc.subject.stw | Dauerhaftes Konsumgut | en |
dc.subject.stw | Steuerpolitik | en |
dc.subject.stw | Public Choice | en |
dc.subject.stw | Steueraufkommen | en |
dc.subject.stw | Zeitkonsistenz | en |
dc.subject.stw | Wohlfahrtseffekt | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Government Incentives when Pollution Permits are Durable Goods | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 503179728 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:zbw:csledp:200106 | en |
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