To free ride or not to free ride? Role of patterning and feedback in the public goods game

Chaudhuri, Ananish; Chen, DeeDee; Graziano, Sara; McIntire, Frances; Winkler, Dawn

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/23220

Title:

To free ride or not to free ride? Role of patterning and feedback in the public goods game

Authors:

Chaudhuri, Ananish
Chen, DeeDee
Graziano, Sara
McIntire, Frances
Winkler, Dawn

Year of Publication:

2003

Series/Report no.:

Wellesley College Working Paper No. 2003-02

Publisher:

Wellesley College, Department of Economics, Wellesley, MA

Abstract:

We study a public goods game where subjects get feedback either continually or intermittently. We find that the intermittent feedback helps to mitigate problems of free riding because subjects in this treatment focus more on a string of choices rather than deciding on a case by case basis as in the continuous feedback treatment.

Subjects:

Public Goods ; Voluntary Contributions Mechanism ; Patterned Feedback ; Free riding ; Expectations

JEL:

C72
C92
C91

Document Type:

Working Paper

Appears in Collections:

Working Papers, Department of Economics, Wellesley College

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