Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/232857 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 14105
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
We provide causal evidence of an ex ante moral hazard effect of Unemployment Insurance (UI) by matching plausibly exogenous changes in UI benefit duration across state-weeks during the Great Recession to high-frequency productivity measures from individual supermarket cashiers. Estimating models with day and cashier-register fixed effects, we identify a modest but statistically significant negative relationship between UI benefits and worker productivity. This effect is strongest for more experienced and less productive cashiers, for whom UI expansions are especially relevant. Additional analyses from the American Time Use Survey reveal a similar increase in shirking during periods with increased UI benefit durations.
Subjects: 
scanner data
shirking
unemployment insurance
JEL: 
I38
J24
J38
J65
L81
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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