Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/233235 
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion paper No. 19
Publisher: 
Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE), Turku
Abstract: 
We consider an n-player bargaining problem where the utility possibility set is compact, convex, and stricly comprehensive. We show that a stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists, and that, if the Pareto surface is differentiable, all such equilibria converge to the Nash bargaining solution as the length of a time period between offers goes to zero. Without the differentiability assumption, convergence need not hold.
Subjects: 
multilateral
bargaining
general utility set
JEL: 
C7
D7
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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