Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/233244 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion paper No. 28
Verlag: 
Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE), Turku
Zusammenfassung: 
We study the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in finite congestion and coordination games. Player set is divided into two disjoint groups, called men and women. A man choosing an action a is better off if the number of other men choosing a decreases, or if the number of women choosing a increases. Analogously, a woman becomes better off if more men or fewer women choose the same action as she does. Existence proofs are constructive: we build simple "best reply" algorithms that converge to an equilibrium.
Schlagwörter: 
congestion
coordination
matching
JEL: 
C70
C72
C78
D83
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
222.79 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.