Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/233262 
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion paper No. 46
Publisher: 
Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE), Turku
Abstract: 
In this paper we trace changes in monetary policy caused by institutional amendments in legal acts of central banks. We estimate coefficients of the Taylor Rule for central banks of Sweden, United Kingdom, Switzerland and EU15 to shed some light on monetary policy ex ante and ex post significant improvements in central bank independence. Results presented suggest differences in accommodating monetary policy in countries and support the idea that initial level of CBI matters for reactions to variability both of inflation and output gap. A preindependence period characterizes with strong inflation targeting features, whereas a post-independence time resembles more discretionary type of monetary policy. As a spin-off from our original idea, we find that changing properties of inflation in the last decade make econometric analysis more difficult
Subjects: 
Taylor rule
central bank independence
interest rate rules
JEL: 
E02
E52
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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