Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/233288 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion paper No. 72
Publisher: 
Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE), Turku
Abstract: 
Pure strategy Markov perfect equilibria (MPE) in dynamic cake sharing problems are analyzed. Each player chooses under perfect information how much to eat from the current cake and how much to leave to the next period. The left over cake grows according to a given growth function. With linear utilities and strictly concave increasing growth function the only symmetric equilibrium with continuous strategies is the trivial equilibrium in which a player eats the whole cake whenever it is his turn to move. This is quite different than in the corresponding single person decision problem (or at a social optimum) where the cake grows from small initial values towards the steady state. A non-trivial equilibrium with a positive steady state exist in the game. In such an equilibrium strategies cannot be continuous. When utilities are concave and the growth function is linear, a nontrivial MPE with a positive steady state may not exist.
Subjects: 
common pool resources
dynamic cake sharing
Markov perfect equilibrium
JEL: 
C72
C73
D92
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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