Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/233308 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion paper No. 92
Verlag: 
Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE), Turku
Zusammenfassung: 
We study non-cooperative link formation games in which players have to decide how much to invest in relationships with other players. The relationship between equilibrium strategies and network centrality measures are investigated in games where there is a common valuation of players as friends. If the utility from relationships with other players is bilinear, then indegree, eigenvector centrality, and the Katz-Bonacich centrality measure put the players in opposite order than the common valuation. If the utility from relationships is strictly concave, then these measures order the players in the same way as the common valuation.
Schlagwörter: 
link formation games
centrality measures
complete network
JEL: 
C72
D43
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
155.05 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.