Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/233311 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion paper No. 95
Publisher: 
Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE), Turku
Abstract: 
We say that a society has a weak norm against lying if, all other things being equal, agents rather lie in such a way that they do not get caught. We show that if this is the case, and it usually is, then Bayesian monotonicity is no longer a constraint in implementation and all incentive compatible social choice functions are Bayesian implementable. In contrast to the previous literature our result derives from a refinement of the standard Bayes-Nash equilibrium that does not rely on any kind of intrinsic lying aversion on which the experimental evidence is mixed. In addition, it suggests that the so called "multiple equilibrium problem" may not be that severe.
Subjects: 
Deception
Implementation
Incentive compatibility
Revelation principle
Social norms and conventions
JEL: 
B41
C72
D78
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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