Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/233313 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion paper No. 97
Verlag: 
Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE), Turku
Zusammenfassung: 
We examine the effect of the replacement rule of a social insurance system on sickness absence. The elasticity of absence with respect to the benefit level is a critical parameter in defining the optimal sickness insurance scheme. A pre-determined, piecewise linear policy rule in which the replacement rate is determined by past earnings allows identification of the causal effect using a regression kink design. Using a large administrative dataset, we find a substantial and robust behavioral response. The statistically significant point estimate of the elasticity of the duration of sickness absence with respect to the replacement rate in a social insurance system is on the order of 1.
Schlagwörter: 
Sick pay
labor supply
sickness absence
paid sick leave
regression kink design
JEL: 
C72
C73
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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