Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/233316 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion paper No. 100
Verlag: 
Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE), Turku
Zusammenfassung: 
We investigate the cases when the Bonacich measures of strongly connected directed bipartite networks can be interpreted as a Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative game. One such case is a two-person game such that the utility functions are bilinear, the matrices of these bilinear forms represent the network, and strategies have norm at most one. Another example is a two-person game with quadratic utility functions. A third example is an m + n person game with quadratic utilitity functions, where the matrices representing the network have dimension m × n. For connected directed bipartite networks we show that the Bonacich measures are unique and give a recursion formula for the computation of the measures. The Bonacich measures of such networks can be interpreted as a subgame perfect equilibrium path of an extensive form game with almost perfect information.
Schlagwörter: 
networks
influence measures
Nash equilibrium
JEL: 
C71
D85
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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