Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/233325 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion paper No. 110
Verlag: 
Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE), Turku
Zusammenfassung: 
Often preferences of agents are such that any sensible goal of the collective must admit a tie between all alternatives. The standard formulation in mechanism design demand that in this case all alternatives are equilibrium outcomes of the social choice mechanism. However, as far as the idea of an equilibrium is to predict the outcome of a game, we could just as well demand that there are no equilibria at all. Although this may seem innocent, and in a technical sense that's right, it is a neglected path to possibility.
Schlagwörter: 
Condorcet Criterion
Collective Decision Making
Implementation
Impossibility Result
Nash Equilibrium
Social Choice Theory
JEL: 
C72
D71
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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