Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/234499 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
GLO Discussion Paper No. 856
Verlag: 
Global Labor Organization (GLO), Essen
Zusammenfassung: 
Using a choice experiment, we test whether taste-based employee discrimination against ethnic minorities is susceptible to loss aversion. In line with empirical evidence from previous research, our results indicate that introducing a hypothetical wage penalty for discriminatory choice behaviour lowers discrimination and that higher penalties have a greater effect. Most notably, we find that the propensity to discriminate is significantly lower when this penalty is loss-framed rather than gain-framed. From a policy perspective, it could therefore be more effective to financially penalise taste-based discriminators than to incentivise them not to discriminate.
Schlagwörter: 
taste-based discrimination
employee discrimination
loss aversion
ethnicity
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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