Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/235105 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
KOF Working Papers No. 491
Verlag: 
ETH Zurich, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, Zurich
Zusammenfassung: 
Allocation decisions are vulnerable to political influence, but it is unclear in which situations politicians use their discretionary power in a partisan manner. We analyze the allocation of presidential disaster declarations in the United States, exploiting the spatiotemporal randomness of all hurricane strikes from 1965-2018. We show that biased declaration behavior is not politically affordable if a disaster is either very strong or weak, when relief provision is clearly necessary or not. However, in ambiguous situations, after medium-intensity hurricanes, presidents favor areas governed by their co-partisans. Our nonlinear estimations demonstrate that this hump-shaped alignment bias exceeds average estimates up to eightfold.
Schlagwörter: 
disaster relief
distributive politics
hurricanes
natural disasters
nonlinearity
party alignment
political influence
political economy
JEL: 
D72
H30
H84
P16
Q54
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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