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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 8940
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
I test whether economic incentives dampen peer effects in public-good settings. I study how a visible and subsidized contribution to a public good (installing solar panels) affects peer contributions that are neither subsidized nor visible (electing green power). Exploiting spatial variation in the feasibility of installing solar panels, I find that panels increase voluntary purchases of green power by neighbors. However, using sharp changes in government incentives over time, I find that the magnitude of the spillover depends on the level of subsidies to solar. The results support the hypothesis that signals drive peer responses to visible public-good contributions and that economic incentives blur those signals.
Schlagwörter: 
motivation
public goods contribution
solar panels
green energy
environmental public goods
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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