Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/235605 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 392
Verlag: 
University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich
Zusammenfassung: 
We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending the classical substitutes condition to markets with externalities, we establish that stable matchings exist when agent choices satisfy substitutability. We show that substitutability is a necessary condition for the existence of a stable matching in a maximal-domain sense and provide a characterization of substitutable choice functions. In addition, we extend the standard insights of matching theory, like the existence of side-optimal stable matchings and the deferred acceptance algorithm, to settings with externalities even though the standard fixed-point techniques do not apply.
Schlagwörter: 
Matching
externalities
two-sided matching
matching with contracts
stable matching
labor markets
deferred acceptance
substitutes
JEL: 
C78
D47
D50
D62
D86
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
433.37 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.