Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/236671 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 9129
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
We report experimental findings on the role of charitable promises in bargaining settings. We vary the enforceability of such promises within variants of ultimatum games where the proposer suggest a split between himself, the responder and a char-itable donation. By reneging on initial pledges, dishonest proposers can turn the bargaining power to their advantage. Providing ex post information on actual dona-tions while leaving the contract incomplete outperforms a complete contract where proposers cannot renege on their charitable promises. The ex post information allows proposers to improve their (self-)image by voluntarily giving more than pledged and thus proving that the charitable pledge was not used for strategic reasons. We identify proposer competition as another (surprising) mechanism that partly eliminates cheat-ing among accepted offers. We relate our findings to calls for information provision on actual CSR activities within the management literature.
Schlagwörter: 
bundling
charity
public good
donation pledges
cheating
prosocial ultimatum game
experiment
JEL: 
C90
D64
H41
L31
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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