Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/237329 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
ECONtribute Discussion Paper No. 084
Publisher: 
University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Reinhard Selten Institute (RSI), Bonn and Cologne
Abstract: 
We model the dynamics of endogenous organizational restructuring, where those being assigned positions in an organization can themselves lobby for who gets which position. Internal labor market changes depend on how much individuals value their own status in the organization, the organizational output, their friends' welfare, and the quality of their own departmental colleagues. Meritocratic assignments are reached with probability one when agents value organizational output even with epsilon weight, provided friend networks and departments are not too large. We also characterize the effects of various voting rules, agendas, and specializations on the paths and the stability of organizational structures.
Subjects: 
organizational reform
assignment
voting
institutions
meritocracy
status
JEL: 
D71
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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