Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/237782 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. TI 2021-049/V
Publisher: 
Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam and Rotterdam
Abstract: 
Information affecting a candidate's reputation might have significant electoral consequences. Do candidates respond to the release of information? Using Brazilian elections and audits as an exogenous source of information, I show that both incumbent and challenger increase their campaign spending when detrimental information affects the incumbent's reputation. Conversely, beneficial information decreases candidates' spending. The main channel is that information affects the expected competitiveness of elections and, therefore, candidates' spending. Only information disclosed prior to electoral campaigns impacts campaign spending. Furthermore, incumbents also adapt a conditional cash transfers program by increasing (decreasing) the beneficiaries when detrimental (beneficial) reputation shocks occur.
Subjects: 
Information
Politicians' reaction
Campaign spending
Elections
Corruption
JEL: 
D72
D73
D83
P16
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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