Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/238231 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers in Economics and Statistics No. 2020-07
Publisher: 
University of Innsbruck, Research Platform Empirical and Experimental Economics (eeecon), Innsbruck
Abstract: 
In credence goods markets, experts have better information about the appropriate quality of treatment than their customers. Experts may exploit their informational advantage by defrauding customers. Market institutions have been shown theoretically to be effective in mitigating fraudulent expert behavior. We analyze whether this positive result carries over to when experts are heterogeneous in their diagnostic abilities. We find that efficient market outcomes are always possible. However, inefficient equilibria can also exist. When such inefficient equilibria are played, a larger share of high-ability experts can lead to more inefficiencies relative to the efficient equilibria.
Subjects: 
Credence good
Diagnosis
Expert
Fraud
Overtreatment
Undertreatment
JEL: 
D82
L15
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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