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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Journal of Risk and Financial Management [ISSN:] 1911-8074 [Volume:] 11 [Issue:] 4 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2018 [Pages:] 1-33
Verlag: 
MDPI, Basel
Zusammenfassung: 
After the Latin American Debt Crisis of 1982, the official response worldwide turned to minimum capital standards to promote stable banking systems. Despite their existence, however, such standards have still not prevented periodic disruptions in the banking sectors of various countries. After the 2007-2009 crisis, bank capital requirements have, in some cases, increased and overall have become even more complex. This paper reviews (1) how Basel-style capital adequacy guidelines have evolved, becoming higher in some cases and overall more complex, (2) how the United States (US) implementation of these guidelines has contributed to regulatory complexity, even when omitting other bank capital regulations that are specific to the US, and (3) how the US regulatory measures still do not provide equally valuable information about whether a bank is adequately capitalized.
Schlagwörter: 
bank regulation
capital adequacy standards
regulatory complexity
US banking crises
JEL: 
G01
G28
K20
L51
N22
N42
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