Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/239399 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Citation: 
[Journal:] Journal of Risk and Financial Management [ISSN:] 1911-8074 [Volume:] 13 [Issue:] 12 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2020 [Pages:] 1-19
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
Information availability, firm performance, idiosyncratic volatility and bankruptcy-risk vary across the Corporate Life Cycle (CLC) stages. The purpose of this paper is to examine whether CLC stages explain firm's propensity to engage in both accrual base and real earning management practices in the context of China. Panel data of 3250 non-financial Chinese listed firms spanning from 2009 to 2018 is used to investigate the proposed relationship. CLC stages were captured through Dickinson's model, while earnings management is measured by employing both techniques, i.e., accruals-base earnings management and real earnings management. The data were analyzed through Panel data fixed-effects and random-effects techniques. Results reveal that, when compared to shakeout phase, managers' response to use both earnings management practices is significantly higher during introduction and decline phases, and lower during growth and mature stages of CLC. It suggests that introductory and later-staged firms distort their factual financial information from creditors to obtain loans without strict debt covenants. Our results are robust to alternate measures and specifications. The core contribution of this research is to add a fresh perspective to the CLC research by uncovering its imperative role in influencing the earning management behavior of corporate managers.
Subjects: 
corporate life cycle
earnings management
accruals-base earnings management
real earnings management
China
debt covenants
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.