Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/239612 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Journal of Risk and Financial Management [ISSN:] 1911-8074 [Volume:] 14 [Issue:] 5 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 1-17
Verlag: 
MDPI, Basel
Zusammenfassung: 
This study examines the effect of the CEO-employee pay gap on productivity and performance. Using extensive data of 751 constituents of the Standard and Poor's (S&P) 1500 index between the years 1992-2016, we found a cubic relationship between salary differential and corporate productivity, with a rising gap adversely affecting productivity principally when it is both too low, as well as too high; intermediate pay inequality levels are less influential. A contrast in the productivity effects of the CEO-worker pay gap for firms with high average salaries and more employees was noticeable, whereas positive productivity gains were present even with a high salary gap. Thus, big companies with a highly skilled workforce are able to achieve tangible benefits through higher salary differentiation. On the other hand, companies with lower average salaries and lower capital intensity were characterized by the negative effects of wage dispersion on productivity. As a result, increasing inequality aversion is an important issue affecting performance among smaller, lower skilled labor dependent firms. Additionally, female CEOs had a significant and positive lagged effect on productivity. Finally, firm market valuation was positively stimulated by the increasing pay gap.
Schlagwörter: 
corporate governance
executive compensation
fairness
pay gap
productivity
value creation
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
cc-by Logo
Dokumentart: 
Article

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
719.66 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.