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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
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[Journal:] Administrative Sciences [ISSN:] 2076-3387 [Volume:] 7 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2017 [Pages:] 1-13
Verlag: 
MDPI, Basel
Zusammenfassung: 
The past few decades have been characterized by a growing body of profit-seeking public service areas with the understanding that profit-seeking organizations will deliver public services more efficiently than government can. These sectors include, but are not limited to, health care, corrections, education and garbage collection. Governments have created quasi markets to attract private providers of services in these sectors, with varying results. Organizational economics has provided the primary explanation for quasi markets, but questions about the sought-for efficiencies actually realized through these markets persist. We integrate resource dependence theory and organizational economics to provide a more comprehensive explanation of the persistence of quasi markets.
Schlagwörter: 
agency theory
property rights
transaction costs
efficiency
public service sector
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