Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/240470 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IFN Working Paper No. 1327
Verlag: 
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Stockholm
Zusammenfassung: 
Boards hire and fire CEOs based on imperfect information. Using comprehensive data on 28 cohorts in Sweden, we analyze the role of a potentially important unobserved attribute - CEO health - in corporate governance. We find CEOs are significantly healthier than the population and other highskill professionals, in particular in mental health. Health at appointment predicts turnover, suggesting boards respond to health problems and correct mismatches that occurred at the time of appointment. Health-related corporate governance appears to work imperfectly, however, as we find CEO health also associates with firm policies requiring an active CEO role.
Schlagwörter: 
Aggregation
Incomplete Adjustment
Revealed Preference
Weak Separability
JEL: 
C14
C60
D01
D10
E40
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
927.09 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.