Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/240948 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Citation: 
[Journal:] Health Economics [ISSN:] 1099-1050 [Volume:] 30 [Issue:] 9 [Publisher:] Wiley [Place:] Hoboken, NJ [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 2307-2311
Publisher: 
Wiley, Hoboken, NJ
Abstract: 
In health economics, the distinction between welfarism and extra-welfarism has been employed to discuss various epistemological and normative differences between health evaluation approaches. However, a clear consensus on the definition of either welfarism, extra-welfarism, or the differences between the two sets of approaches has not emerged. I propose an alternative set of distinctions that allows for a more fine-grained categorization of health evaluation approaches. This categorization focuses on five dimensions: (1) the maximand of an evaluation approach, (2) its sensitivity toward normative concerns that defy compensation, (3) its position on which groups of individuals or collective entities act as sources of values, (4) its sensitivity to changes of mind, and (5) the inclusion of process-external values.
Subjects: 
deliberative democracy
ethics
philosophy of health economics
political philosophy
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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