Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/241826 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] China Journal of Accounting Research [ISSN:] 1755-3091 [Volume:] 13 [Issue:] 4 [Publisher:] Elsevier [Place:] Amsterdam [Year:] 2020 [Pages:] 387-404
Verlag: 
Elsevier, Amsterdam
Zusammenfassung: 
Agencies can reduce problems by adopting a governance structure of multiple large shareholders. However, multiple large shareholders may collude, thereby reducing the behavior that can create long-term value for the company. This paper uses a sample of companies listed on the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges between 2008 and 2017 to investigate the relationship between multiple large shareholders and corporate environmental protection investment (CEPI). We find that multiple large shareholders will significantly reduce CEPI. Specifically, external supervision and a company's ownership structure affect the relationship between multiple large shareholders and CEPI. In addition, after participating in SOEs, non-state-owned shareholders will significantly improve CEPI of SOEs.
Schlagwörter: 
Multiple large shareholders
Corporate environmental protection investment
SOEs
Ownership structure
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Dokumentart: 
Article

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
509.25 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.