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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/24210
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DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Böhringer, Christoph | en |
dc.contributor.author | Koschel, Henrike | en |
dc.contributor.author | Moslener, Ulf | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-02-16T14:50:00Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-02-16T14:50:00Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2006 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/24210 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Energy markets and energy-intensive industries in all EU member states – especially in Germany – are subject to a diverse set of policies related to climate change. Weanalyse the potential efficiency losses from simultaneous application of emission taxes andemissions trading in qualitative and quantitative terms within a partial equilibrium frameworkfor the EU. It turns out that those firms within the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS)which at the same time are subject to domestic energy or carbon taxes will abate inefficientlymuch while other firms within the EU ETS will benefit from lower international emissionpermit prices. The same logic disproves the argument that additional national emission taxeswill reduce inefficiencies in abatement supposed to be resulting from allowance (over-)allocation. In essence, unilateral emission taxes within the EU ETS are ecologicallyineffective and subsidise net permit buyers. Thus, all firms that are subject to emissionstrading and any CO2 emission taxes at the same time should be exempt from the latter. Theforegone tax revenue could be generated by auctioning a small fraction of the permits instead.This would be cheaper for the emissions trading sectors as a whole and could be compatibleeven with the tight auctioning restrictions of the EU directive. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aZentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) |cMannheim | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aZEW Discussion Papers |x06-018 | en |
dc.subject.jel | Q58 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H22 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H21 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D61 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | emissions trading | en |
dc.subject.keyword | emission taxes | en |
dc.subject.keyword | National Allocation Plans | en |
dc.subject.stw | Klimaschutz | en |
dc.subject.stw | Emissionshandel | en |
dc.subject.stw | Ökosteuer | en |
dc.subject.stw | Wirtschaftspolitische Wirkungsanalyse | en |
dc.subject.stw | Umweltschutz | en |
dc.subject.stw | Allokationseffizienz | en |
dc.subject.stw | Excess Burden | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | EU-Staaten | en |
dc.title | Efficiency Losses from Overlapping Economic Instruments in European Carbon Emissions Regulation | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 510225071 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:zbw:zewdip:4597 | en |
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