Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/242372 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2021: Climate Economics
Verlag: 
ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, Kiel, Hamburg
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper analyzes the inner workings of cartels. To understand how sanctioning institutions prevent cartel formation we study their effect on firms' communication in a laboratory experiment. Using machine learning to organize the chat communication into topics, we find that firms are less likely to communicate explicitly about price fixing when sanctioning institutions are present. At the same time, average prices are lower when communication is less explicit. A mediation analysis suggests that sanctions are effective in hindering cartel formation not only because they introduce a risk of being fined but also by reducing the prevalence of explicit price communication
Schlagwörter: 
cartel
collusion
communication
machine learning
experiment
JEL: 
C92
D43
L41
Dokumentart: 
Conference Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
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