Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/245495 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 9314
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
We investigate how changes in the administrative-territorial structure affect ethnic voting. We present an event study design that exploits the 2010 constitutional reform in Kenya, which substantially increased the number of primary administrative regions. We find (i) strong evidence for a reduction in ethnic voting when administrative regions become less ethnically diverse and (ii) weak evidence for such a reduction when ethnic groups become less fragmented across regions. These results suggest that 'ethnofederal' reforms (leading to administrative borders that more closely follow ethnic boundaries) can mitigate ethnic politics in diverse countries.
Subjects: 
ethnofederalism
decentralization
territorial structure
ethnic divisions
ethnic voting
ethnic politics
Kenya
JEL: 
D02
D72
H77
J15
O55
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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