Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/245580 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 14529
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
We present field experimental evidence that limited information about workseekers' skills distorts both firm and workseeker behavior. Assessing workseekers' skills, giving workseekers their assessment results, and helping them to credibly share the results with firms increases workseekers' employment and earnings. It also aligns their beliefs and search strategies more closely with their skills. Giving assessment results only to workseekers has similar effects on beliefs and search, but smaller effects on employment and earnings. Giving assessment results only to firms increases callbacks. These patterns are consistent with two-sided information frictions, a new finding that can inform the design of information-provision mechanisms.
Subjects: 
skills
job search
employment
wages
labor markets
active labor market
JEL: 
J23
J24
J31
J41
O15
O17
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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