Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/246172 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ECB Working Paper No. 2595
Verlag: 
European Central Bank (ECB), Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
We study the relationship between banks' size and risk-taking in the context of supranational banking supervision. Consistently with theoretical work on banking unions and in contrast to analyses emphasising incentives under- pinned by the too-big-to-fail effect, we find an inverse relationship between banks' size and non-performing loan growth for a sample of European banks. Evidence is provided that the mechanism operates through the enhanced organisational efficiency of the supranational set-up rather than incentives alignment among the supervisors and the banks.
Schlagwörter: 
Supervision
euro area
non-performing loans
banking union
too-big-to-fail
JEL: 
F33
G21
G28
G32
C20
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
ISBN: 
978-92-899-4818-0
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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