Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/248263 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper No. 1071
Versionsangabe: 
March 7, 2021
Verlag: 
Yale University, Economic Growth Center, New Haven, CT
Zusammenfassung: 
Attempts to curb undesired behavior through regulation gets complicated when agents can adapt to circumvent enforcement. We test a model of enforcement with learning and adaptation, by auditing vendors selling illegal fish in Chile in a randomized controlled trial, and tracking them daily using mystery shoppers. Conducting audits on a predictable schedule and (counter-intuitively) at high frequency is less effective, as agents learn to take advantage of loopholes. A consumer information campaign proves to be almost as cost-effective and curbing illegal sales, and obviates the need for complex monitoring and policing. The Chilean government subsequently chooses to scale up this campaign.
Schlagwörter: 
Enforcement
Regulation
Law and Economics
Fisheries
JEL: 
K42
O1
L51
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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