Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/248482 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DIW Discussion Papers No. 1979
Verlag: 
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
Worldwide, the overwhelming majority of large horizontal mergers are cleared by antitrust authorities unconditionally. The presumption seems to be that efficiencies from these mergers are sizeable. We calculate the compensating efficiencies that would prevent a merger from harming consumers for 1,014 mergers affecting 12,325 antitrust markets scrutinized by the European Commission between 1990 and 2018. Compensating efficiencies seem too large to be achievable for many mergers. Barriers to entry and the number of firms active in the market are the most important factors determining their size. We highlight concerns about the Commission's merger enforcement being too lax.
Schlagwörter: 
Compensating efficiencies
Efficiency gains
Merger control
Concentration,Screens
HHI
Mergers
Unilateral Effects
Market Definition
Entry barriers
JEL: 
L19
L24
L40
K21
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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